A quantum key distribution scheme based on the use of squeezed states is presented. The states are squeezed in one of two field quadrature components, and the value of the squeezed component is used to encode a character from an alphabet. The uncertainty relation between quadrature components prevents an eavesdropper from determining both with enough precision to determine the character being sent. Losses degrade the performance of this scheme, but it is possible to use phase sensitive amplifiers to boost the signal and partially compensate for their effect.
Introduction
Quantum cryptography provides a means of sending a secure message, and it does this by allowing one to establish a secure key. In all but the simplest codes, what is sent is not only the coded message, but also a key which tells the receiver how to decode the message. The coded message can be sent through a public channel, but the key must be sent through a secure one. Quantum mechanics allows one to construct a channel in which the presence of an eavesdropper can be detected [1] - [3] . The key can be sent through this channel, and if no eavesdropping is found, the key will be secure. Working quantum cryptographic systems have been constructed in several laboratories [4] - [8] .
The quantum cryptographic schemes proposed so far have all involved the transmission of single particles. For example, in one scheme, single photons are sent down an optical fiber, and information is carried by the polarization of the photons. Experimental implementations of this method use weak coherent pulses rather than single photons. Losses limit the distances over which this method can be used; if the fiber is too long, the probability of the photon emerging from the fiber without being absorbed is small. Amplifiers cannot be used to boost the signal, because they destroy the quantum coherence which is essential for the method to work. A second approach, which also suffers from this limitation, uses weak, overlapping coherent states [9] - [11] . In this case, the information is encoded in the phase of the coherent state.
One possible way around the limitation imposed by losses is to use pulses consisting of more than one photon. Care, however, is required, because the eavesdropper may siphon off enough of the pulse to learn what information it is carrying, but send the rest of the pulse on its way. It has been shown by Ralph that multiphoton pulses in coherent states are vulnerable to this kind of attack [12] . It is necessary to use pulses for which this kind of eavesdropping will not work.
Recently Ralph has presented a method of using squeezed states for quantum cryptography [12] . In this scheme sequences of symbols are impressed on two squeezed beams by Alice. The beams are then mixed at a beam splitter, and the mixed beams, along with a local oscillator for each, is sent to Bob. A random phase delay is introduced into one of the beams and its local oscillator in order to destroy the phase coherence between the two beams. Bob, by using both beams and their local oscillator signals, can, by using homodyne detections, recover one of the two sequences but not both. An eavesdropper is in the same position as Bob, but she does not know which sequence Bob will read, and if she uses a capture-resend strategy, every time she guesses incorrectly, she will introduce detectable errors. The squeezing prevents her from gaining useful information by splitting off parts of the beams.
Here we shall investigate a different scheme based on squeezed light. Alice sends displaced squeezed vacuum states to Bob which are squeezed in one of two orthogonal field quadrature components. Bob chooses at random which of the components to measure. The security of this method of transmission is a result of the uncertainty relation for field quadrature components. The effect of loss is examined, and it is found that its effect can be partially compensated by using degenerate parametric amplifiers to boost the signal. This method should be secure against the capture-resend strategy and a strategy which employs a beam splitter to sample part of the signal. In the latter case, it is the vacuum noise which presents a major problem for the eavesdropper.
Procedure
A single-mode classical field is characterized by a complex amplitude, or equivalently, by its real and imaginary parts, which we shall designate by x 1 and x 2 , respectively. Quantum mechanically, the complex amplitude corresponds to the mode annihilation operator, a, and the real and imaginary parts to the operators X 1 and X 2 , respectively, where
These operators do not commute and obey the uncertainty relation (h = 1)
This uncertainty relation implies that X 1 and X 2 cannot both be defined to arbitrarily high accuracy for a given quantum state. Is is this fact which will form the basis of our quantum cryptography system. It is often useful to represent quantum states in a phase space whose axes are x 1 and x 2 . The state is pictured as a point surrounded by an error box. The point is located at x 1 = X 1 and x 2 = X 2 , and the error box represents the fluctuations of the amplitude about its mean value. For a coherent state, the error box is a circle of radius 1/2, while for a minimum uncertainty squeezed state, it is an ellipse whose minor axis is parallel to the direction of the squeezing. The area of the ellipse is the same as that of the circle. Its shape, however, allows us to have one of the variables, say X 1 , very precisely defined, while the other, X 2 , is very poorly defined.
In explaining how this can be used to send a message, we invoke the usual cast of characters which appears in discussions of quantum cryptography, Alice, Bob, and Eve. Alice wants to establish a key with Bob, and Eve wants to intercept it without being detected. Alice and Bob use the following method to set up a shared key. The x 1 and x 2 axes are divided up into bins of size δ, where δ < 1/2. Each bin corresponds, by previous agreement, to a symbol in an alphabet. The key will consist of a sequence of symbols from this alphabet. For example, a not very efficient choice of alphabet would be would be the symbols 0 and 1, and every other bin could represent 0 while the intervening ones represent 1. A more efficient choice would be to use a larger alphabet.
Alice now sends to Bob one of two kinds of squeezed states. The first kind can be represented by an ellipse which is centered on the x 1 axis and is squeezed in the x 1 direction to a width considerably less than δ. This type of state has very well-defined x 1 value but a poorly defined x 2 value. The second kind is represented by an ellipse which is centered on the x 2 axis and is squeezed in the x 2 direction, also to a width considerably less than δ. This state has a well-defined x 2 value but a poorly defined x 1 value. We shall call the first kind of state an x 1 state and the second kind an x 2 state.
The number of bins on each axis depends on the length of the ellipses. Let δx maj be the length of the major axis of the ellipses representing the x 1 and x 2 states (it is assumed to be the same for both). On the x 1 axis, the bins run from −δx maj /2 to δx maj /2, and have the same range on the x 2 axis. This means that the collection of all x 1 states, each centered in a particular bin on the x 1 axis, covers the same region of phase space as does the collection of x 2 states. Therefore, an eavesdropper cannot determine whether a state is an x 1 or an x 2 state from the result of a single measurement of X 1 or X 2 .
Alice now decides at random whether to send an x 1 or an x 2 state, and Bob decides, also at random, whether to measure X 1 or X 2 . This measurement can be performed by using homodyne detection. Alice and Bob then communicate with each other via a public channel. For each state which Alice sent, she tells Bob what kind of state, x 1 or x 2 , it was, and Bob tells Alice what kind of measurement he made. Alice does not tell Bob the X 1 or X 2 values of the states she sent, and Bob does not tell Alice the results of his measurements. After this public communication, Alice and Bob keep the results for which Bob made a measurement corresponding to the state which Alice sent, e. g. when Alice sent an x 1 state and Bob measured X 1 , and discard the others. For each of these transmissions, Bob knows the value of the variable, x 1 or x 2 , which Alice sent so they both know which bin the state falls in. They then assign to this transmission the alphabet symbol corresponding to this bin. The result is a sequence of symbols which can be used as a key.
Why is this key secure? In order to know which bin a given state falls into, Eve must be able to determine either x 1 or x 2 to an accuracy of at least δ. The problem is, she does not know which measurement to make, and she is forbidden by the uncertainty principle from measuring both to the necessary accuracy. She must choose to measure X 1 or X 2 if she wishes to determine the key symbol, and if she chooses the wrong one, she gains no information and disturbs the message. This disturbance can be detected by Alice and Bob. They can compare a subset of the transmissions for which they should agree. If they find errors, i. e. if they find they do not agree on some of these symbols, they can conclude there was an eavesdropper present.
Let us now see how small δ needs to be, and how much squeezing we need. For a squeezed vacuum state, squeezed in the x 1 direction, the probability distribution for the observable X 1 is given by (see Appendix A)
where ρ sqvac is the density matrix corresponding to the squeezed vacuum state, v = (1/2)e −2r , and r ≥ 0 is the squeezing parameter (r = 0 corresponds to the vacuum state which is not squeezed). The probability, p δ , that
where erf(x) is the error function and is given by
Suppose we want the probability of making an error, i. e. the probability of finding x 1 outside the inverval [−δ/2, δ/2], to be less than 10 −3 . We find that 1 − erf(2.51) = 3.9 × 10 −4 [13] , so that if
then the error probability will be less than 10 −3 . If we choose δ to be 1/8, then we can choose v = 6.2 × 10 −4 which implies that the squeezing parameter is 3.3. Because the number of photons in a squeezed vacuum is a † a = sinh 2 r, the number of photons in this state is 200. The width of the state in the x 2 direction is just e r /2 which is, with our choices, 14, and this implies that in that direction the state has substantial overlap with approximately 110 bins.
This means that if we measure the state in the x 1 direction we can determine with very good probability which bin it lies in, but if it is measured in the x 2 direction, the result is essentially random.
Effect of Losses
As the light travels down a fiber it will experience losses and this will degrade the squeezing. These losses can be described by the master equation
Here ρ is the density matrix of the field and γ is the loss rate. In order to find the density matrix at the end of the fiber, one solves this equation for ρ(t) and sets t = T = L/c, where L is the length of the fiber. There are a number of ways to solve this equation one of which is discussed Appendix B. The result for p(x 1 ) at the output of the fiber is again given by Eq. (3), but now
The probability of finding x 1 within a bin of size δ is still given by Eq. (4), but with the new value of v. For a given value of p δ , or, equivalently, a given error probability, this relation gives a bound on the size of the loss which can be tolerated. Note that even if the initial squeezing were infinite (a physical impossibility, because this would require infinite energy), the size of the acceptable loss is finite, and, in fact, quite small. For example, for an error probability of less than 10 −3 , with the same value of δ as above, we can again choose v = 6.2 × 10 −4 which gives us that that γT < 1.2 × 10 −3 or for a fiber of length one kilometer, a maximum loss of 1.2 × 10 −6 per meter. It is possible to use a degenerate parametric amplifier to partially compensate for the effect of losses. In order to see how this works, we shall compare the action of a fiber of length L = T c to that of two fibers of length L/2 with a degenerate parametric amplifier, with gain G > 1, between them to boost the signal. We shall consider what happens to an x 1 state, the effect on an x 2 state is similar.
In the case of the fiber of length L we have that
Because we wish to find which bin the initial state is in, we define a variable ξ = e γT /2 X 1 (T ) which has the property that
A measurement of ξ will tell us with high probability which bin the original state was in if ∆ξ is considerably smaller than δ, or ∆ξ < sδ,
where s < 1, and its actual size is determined by the probability of error which we can tolerate. In order to satisfy this condition the loss must be such that
Now let us look at the case with the amplifier. After the first fiber we have
The amplifier can be set to amplify either X 1 or X 2 ; if it amplifies X 1 , then X 1 → GX 1 and X 2 → (1/G)X 2 , while if it is set to amplify X 2 , then X 1 → (1/G)X 1 and X 2 → GX 2 . Let us suppose that it is set to amplify X 1 which has the effect of multiplying the right-hand side of the first of Eqs. (13) by G and the second by G 2 . Finally, after the second fiber we have
Again we are interested in the value of X 1 at the beginning of the first fiber, so we define
which implies that
In the limit of large gain, the requirement on the loss so that ∆ξ 1 < sδ is that (for γT ≪ 1)
a less stringent requirement by a factor of two over the single long fiber. Therefore, the amplifier, by boosting the signal, has reduced the effect of the losses. It remains to be seen what happens if the amplifier is set to amplify X 2 , and an x 1 state is sent. In that case we define the variable
which has the following properties:
In the high gain limit the requirement on the losses is
This is a much more stringent requirement on the losses that that imposed by the single long fiber. This analysis suggests that Alice and Bob should use the following protocol if a fiber with amplifiers is to be used. Alice decides at random whether to send an x 1 or an x 2 state and independently decides, also at random, whether the amplifiers should amplify X 1 or X 2 . She then sends the state, and Bob measures either X 1 or X 2 , with this choice being again random. If Alice and Bob make the same choice, and the amplifiers are set the same way, e. g. both decide to measure X 1 and the amplifiers also amplify X 1 , then they can use that transmission, otherwise they discard it.
If the amplifier settings are secure, then this procedure can be simplified and Alice can set the amplifiers in accord with the state she sends. On the other hand, if they are not, and Eve knows which quadrature component is being amplified, then the random setting is necessary. There is, in addition, a limit on the gain of the amplifiers which follows from the fact that Alice and Bob must be able to use the cases in which Alice's preparation and Bob's measurement agree, but the amplifier is set incorrectly, to detect the presence of the eavesdropper.
If Alice and Bob can only use the cases in which everything agrees, preparation, amplifier setting, and measurement, to detect Eve, then she has a successful eavesdropping strategy which cannot be detected. Eve simply determines which quadrature is being amplified, measures that quadrature, and and sends a state which agrees with the result of her measurement on to Bob. Using this strategy Eve will only make incorrect measurements when the amplifier is set to amplify the wrong quadrature component, in which case that transmission will be discarded anyway. Thus, it is essential that Alice and Bob be able to examine the transmissions for which their preparation and measurement agree, but the amplifier is set incorrectly, and see the effect of Eve's measurement.
Let us now see what kinds of restrictions this requirement imposes. In the case in which the amplifier is set properly, we want the third term in the brackets in the second of Eqs. (16) to be much smaller than the other two. This implies that we need
The second of these inequalities implies that we simply need G 2 ≫ 1, and if we assume that ∆X 1 (0) ∼ sδ, and in addition assume that the requirement in Eq. (17) is obeyed, then the first of the above inequalities also reduces to G 2 ≫ 1. Now let us see what happens when the amplifier is set incorrectly. With no intervention by Eve, we have that ∆ξ 2 ∼ G. If, however, Eve makes an incorrect measurement, then the uncertainty in the result of her measurement will be of order 1/(sδ). This uncertainty will be reflected in the state she sends to Bob, and consequently he will find ∆ξ 2 ∼ 1/(sδ). If G is chosen so that
then even by examining the cases in which the amplifier is set incorrectly, Alice and Bob can, by comparing their results, tell whether an eavesdropper was present.
Eavesdropping
Let us now consider two possible methods of eavesdropping on this system. The first is just the capture-resend strategy, and the second involves using a beam splitter to split off part of the signal, and performing measurements on that part to gain information about the signal. In both cases, we shall find that the intervention of the eavesdropper is detectable.
In the capture-resend strategy, Eve measures the entire signal, and then, on the basis of her measurement result, prepares a second state which she sends on to Bob. Her problem is that she does not know whether she should measure X 1 or X 2 , and, if δ is chosen small enough, she will introduce errors if she chooses incorrectly.
If δ is chosen too large, in particular, larger than 1/2, Eve has a straightforward eavesdropping strategy. She can measure both X 1 and X 2 to an accuracy of approximately 1/2. This can be accomplished either by splitting the signal into two parts using a 50-50 beam splitter and measuring X 1 at one output and X 2 at the other [14] , or by amplifying the signal, so that it becomes essentially classical, and performing measurements on it [15] . After performing these measurements, she sends a coherent state to Bob which is centered on the results of her measurement. That is, if she obtained results x 2 , to use, and Alice and Bob will not be able to detect the eavesdropping. This is because the coherent state which Eve sent to Bob will have the correct value of x 1 for an x 1 state and the correct value of x 2 for an x 2 state, and both with sufficiently high accuracy that Bob will assign the result of his measurement to the correct bin. Therefore, it is necessary to choose δ smaller than 1/2 in order to foil this strategy. If δ has been chosen considerably smaller than 1/2 the above strategy no longer works, because Eve can no longer determine both X 1 and X 2 to the desired accuracy, i. e. δ. She will have to choose which to measure, and after making the measurement, will send to Bob a state squeezed in the direction which she chose centered on the result of her measurement. If, however, she made the wrong choice, the state she sends to Bob will be squeezed in the wrong direction and centered on the wrong point. This will introduce errors, which, by comparing a subset of the results on which they agree, i. e. Bob's measurement corresponded to the kind of state which Alice sent, Alice and Bob can detect the eavesdropping.
Let us now suppose that δ has been chosen sufficently small, and that instead of measuring the entire signal, Eve uses a beam splitter to sample a part of it. She sends on to Bob the part of the signal which is transmitted through the beam splitter and performs measurements on the part which is reflected. We would like to see how much she can learn, and how much she disturbs the signal state. We shall call the two modes which the beam splitter couples modes 1 and 2, and the signal will go into the input port for mode 1 and the vacuum into the input for mode 2. The relation between the input and output operators is [16] 
where U is the unitary operator which implements the beam-splitter transformation, and R and T are the reflection and transmission coefficients, respectively. These have to be chosen in such a way that we minimize the disturbance to the signal state, but, nevertheless, gain some information about it. We shall suppose that Alice has sent an x 1 state, and see what happens both in the case Eve makes an X 1 measurement and in the case she makes an X 2 measurement. Now suppose that Alice has sent an x 1 state centered on x 1 = s with squeezing parameter r, and let σ = e −r . Eve inserts the beam splitter and measures X 1 at the mode 2 output port. We shall denote by X jk the operator X j for the kth mode, where both j and k can be either 1 or 2. We shall also drop the superscript (in) on all in operators with the understanding that operators without a superscript are in operators. From Eq. (23) we have that for initially uncorrelated modes
or for our input state,
This last equation tells us about the information gain from Eve's measurement. In order to learn about Alice's state with some degreee of accuracy, ∆X 
From this equation it is clear that if we want to determine x 11 with an accuracy of order δ, then we must have T /R of order δ.
Let us now see what is the effect of Eve's measurement on the transmitted signal state. In the x 1 representation the initial wave function of the system is (see Appendix A)
where
is the wave function of the x 1 state,
is the wave function of the vacuum state, and x 11 is the x 1 coordinate for mode 1 and x 12 is the x 1 coordinate for mode 2. After the beam splitter the wave function is (see Appendix A)
If Eve now measures X 12 and obtains the result y, the wave function becomes a product of a wave function in mode 1 and an "eigenstate" of X 12 with eigenvalue y in mode 2. The mode 1 wave function, ψ y (x 11 ) is then
where N is a normalization constant. This is the wave function which will be sent on to Bob. Comparing Eqs.(28) and (31) we see that there are two effects of the measurement on the wave function. First, the center of the Gaussian has shifted, and, second, its width has changed. We want both of these changes to be small. As a result of the beam splitter and measurement, the width has changed as follows:
In order for this change to be small, it is necessary that T be of order one. The shift in the center of the Gaussian is given by
Note that if T = 1 the center suffers no shift while if T = 0 it is shifted all the way to zero. This clearly implies that in order to produce a small change we want T to be close to one. Assuming this to be the case, which means that R ≪ 1, and also that σ is small, we find that the shift, ∆s, is given by
Now y is random, but will typically be of order − √ Rs (see Eq. (25)) so that if the shift is to be less than δ in magnitude, we must have
However, s can be anywhere between −1/σ and 1/σ, so that we need to require that R < σδ,
which is a very stringent requirement.
Comparing the requirements for information gain and small disturbance, we see that they are incompatible. Information gain requires a small transmission coefficient, while a small disturbance requires a transmission coefficient close to one, and there is no overlap in the permitted ranges. Therefore, using this method, if Eve diverts enough light to gain useful information, she will also produce a detectable disturbance. The real problem for Eve is the vacuum noise. If she samples only a small part of the signal, in order to minimize the disturbance, what little signal she sees is swamped by vacuum noise.
Conclusion
A method for using squeezed states to perform quantum key distribution has been presented. It relies on the uncertainty relation for field quadrature components for its security. As with other methods, it is adversely affected by losses, but it is possible in this case to use amplifiers to reduce their effect. We have shown that this method is secure against several eavesdropping strategies, but have not presented a general proof of its security.
Squeezed states are an example of a nonclassical field state, that is a state whose photodetection properties cannot be simulated by a classical stochastic field. They have proven to be useful for teleportation [17] - [19] and now for quantum cryptography as well. This leads one to ask whether other kinds of nonclasical states could prove useful in quantum information, and suggests that this should be a fruitful line of research.
In order to obtain the wave function of a squeezed vacuum state which has been shifted by s in the x 1 direction, we simply replace x 1 by x 1 − s in the above equation.
Next we would like to see how wave functions in the x 1 representation are transformed under the action of a beam splitter. Let our initial state be x 11 , x 12 |Ψ = Ψ in (x 11 , x 12 ), then our task is to find Defining χ ′ (ξ) = exp(|ξ| 2 /2)χ(ξ), we find that χ ′ (ξ) satisfies
whose solution is given by χ ′ (ξ, t) = χ ′ (e −γt/2 ξ, 0).
This implies that χ(ξ, t) = exp[−(1 − e −γt )|ξ| 2 /2]χ(e −γt/2 ξ, 0).
Our next task is to relate the characteristic function to the x 1 distribution of the density matrix. If we let q and p be the real and imaginary parts of ξ, ξ = q + ip, then χ(ξ) = e −iqp Tr(e 2ipX1 e −2iqX2 ρ),
dx 1 e 2ipx1 x 1 |e −2iqX2 ρ|x 1 .
Setting q = 0 we see that x 1 |ρ|x 1 is just the Fourier transform of χ(p), so
In order to find x 1 |ρ(t)|x 1 for an initial squeezed vacuum state, we first use Eq. (55) and the results of Appendix A to find χ(p) at t = 0. We then use Eq. (54) to find χ(p, t), and finally, Eq. (56) to find x 1 |ρ(t)|x 1 .
